摘要
分析了装备采购的博弈过程及费用控制的信息非对称性问题,构造了装备采购的委托代理关系,建立了军方与供应商的博弈模型,探讨了军方如何激励供应商降低装备采购费用的问题,并运用进化规划算法给出了仿真算例。结果表明:在信息非对称的情况下,军方利用所建的费用控制模型,能够减少供应商的道德风险,改变传统的单纯从政策上要求供应商的做法,从机制和技术上达到控制采购费用的目的。
The game process for equipment procurement and asymmetry information for cost control were not only analyzed, but the principal-agent relationship of the equipment procurement was also formed. Then, the game model between the army and contractor was built. At last, the issue of how the army encourages the contractor to reduce the cost of equipment procurement was discussed and the simulation example was given by means of evolution algorithm. The results indicate that the military using cost control model can reduce the contractors’ moral hazard under asymmetry information condition. Meanwhile, changing traditional practice that only gives requirement to the contractors according to the policy, the military can control the procurement cost institutionally and technically.
出处
《系统仿真学报》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2006年第z2期111-113,共3页
Journal of System Simulation
关键词
信息非对称
委托-代理
激励机制
费用控制
建模与仿真
asymmetry information
principal-agent
incentive measure
cost control
model and simulation
