摘要
早期维特根斯坦将语言意义约束在世界中,其有无表达为作图式语言(非镜式语言)的能力与无能。思想批判表现为语言批判。由于作图式语言面临的种种困难,后期维特根斯坦将语言意义约束在语言使用的游戏中,其有无表达为对语言的可能使用与不可能使用。维特根斯坦对语言意义看法的演化让他进入并超越了哲学的语言转向。
Early Wittgenstein holds that in the world lies the sense of language, obtain or absence of which depends on the ability of a pictorial （not mirror-like） language. To eliminate problems arising from the idea of a pictorial language, Wittgenstein then deems that the sense of language comes from possible （not ordinary） linguistic practice or possible （ordinary） language games. As a result, beyond possible area of language, there is no sense. Language game is not simply language only. The evolvement of Wittgenstein＇s view on sense of language shows that he first completes and then transcends the linguistic turn of philosophy.
出处
《武汉大学学报（人文科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第6期716-721,共6页
Wuhan University Journal (Humanity Sciences)
