摘要
本文运用不对称信息理论对高校教师评价过程存在的逆向选择和道德风险进行分析,指出不对称风险的产生源自于高校教师专业服务的复杂性和评价结果的不确定性,通过委托代理理论框架,进一步确认原因在于校方与教师之间存在信息分布不对称和偏好取向的不同。未来高校教师评价体系发展的关键是要设计一种激励机制来实现有效的信号传递、信息甄别,推动激励相容和声誉约束机制的建立。
This article analyses the risks of adverse selection and moral hazard in the process of university faculty evaluation using the theory of information disequilibrium. It argues that these risks are produced by the complex nature of the academic professional service and the uncertainty in the result of faculty evaluation. The article further argues that, through the framework of principal-agent theory, these risks are rooted in information disequilibrium between the university and its faculty and different orientations in their development need. The main conclusion is that the key to the future development of university faculty evaluation system is to eastablish incentive mechanism with incentive that enables effective signal transfer and information screening, so that the evaluation system can function with incentive compatibility constraint and reputation constraint.
出处
《清华大学教育研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第5期101-106,共6页
Tsinghua Journal of Education
关键词
信息不对称
高校教师
评价体系
逆向选择
道德风险
information disequilibrium
university faculty
evaluation system
adverse selection
moral hazard
