摘要
专利许可已经成为现代经济中的一个普遍现象。本文建立了正式的产业组织模型,分析了在专利许可中被许可企业的自主创新能力与专利许可费用、市场结构的关系。我们发现,即使掌握着专利的上游厂商和被许可的下游厂商在最终品市场上构成竞争关系,只要下游厂商具有相对成本优势,专利所有者总是有激励给下游厂商提供专利许可。但是,许可费用的高低则与下游厂商的研发能力密切相关,存在“门槛效应”。如果下游厂商的研发能力低于某临界值,则其创新能力大小不会影响最终的均衡许可费用和市场结构;而当其创新能力超过该临界值以后,其创新能力越高,最终需要交纳的专利许可费用就越低,最终的市场结构也就越有利于下游企业。
Patent license is becoming more and more popular in modem society, This paper analyze the influence of licensee＇s innovation ability on running royalty and market structure, we find that the patentee and licensees will often agree on a running royalty equal to the full cost savings from the patented technology as long as the licensee has a cost advantage. But the licensee＇s innovation ability plays an important role on the determination of the running royalty. There exists a threshold value. If the licensee＇s innovation ability is higher than the threshold value, then the higher the licensee＇s innovation ability is, the lower the running royalty is. But if the licensee＇s innovation ability is lower than the threshold value, then it has no effect on the running royalty.
出处
《产业经济研究》
2006年第5期1-7,共7页
Industrial Economics Research
关键词
专利许可
成本优势
自主创新能力
门槛效应
patent license
cost advantage
innovation ability
threshold value
