摘要
中国保险公司治理的基本特征是“股东单边治理”,本文基于知识和创新的视角指出,股东单边治理的根本缺陷在于无法对经理层进行有效的内部制衡和市场制衡,上述缺陷导致中国保险公司内部治理结构失衡。不同国家采用不同方式对股东单边治理缺陷进行弥补。通过理论推导和国外实践,本文指出中国保险公司治理发展只能走利益相关者内部治理主导模式。
The character of Chinese insurance corporate governance is 'shareholder unilateral governance' . The paper shows that the weakness of shareholder unilateral governance lies in deficiency of internal and market restriction on managers, from the perspective of knowledge and innovation. The weakness above leads to structural disequilibrium of Chinese insurance corporate governance. Different countries use different ways to make up for the weakness of shareholder unilateral governance. Finally, the paper points out that Chinese insurance corporate governance should orient toward the model of interested parties internal governance.
出处
《财贸经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第9期63-69,共7页
Finance & Trade Economics
关键词
股东单边治理
默会知识
创新
Shareholder Unilateral Governance, Tacit Knowledge, Innovation
