摘要
作者通过构建不对称信息结构下的两阶段博弈模型,应用Bayes法则对证券监管者声誉和承销商声誉的动态化以及二者声誉变动的关联性进行了研究。模型结论显示,监管者对承销商的违规或错误评估行为的“宽容”以及任何“下不为例”的监管思维不仅会加剧自身声誉的下降,而且会导致承销商评估失误概率的上升和承销商声誉的下降,表明监管者声誉和承销商声誉具有一损俱损的关联性。
Through constructing a two -phase game model under asymmetric information structure, using the Bayes ride, the dynamic changes in regulator＇s reputation and underwriter＇s reputation and their correlation are researched. The model conclusion shows that the regulators＇ tolerance of the violation or misevaluation behavior of underwriters will not only lead to the quick decrease of their own reputation, but also result in the increase of the misevaluation probability and the damage of the underwriters＇reputation.
出处
《经济经纬》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第5期116-119,共4页
Economic Survey
关键词
不对称信息
监管者声誉
承销商声誉
声誉关联性
asymmetric information
regulators＇reputation
underwriters＇reputation
reputation correlativity
