摘要
本文收集了1992年5月以来国家颁布的关于中小投资者利益保护的法律法规，以1990--2003年深沪两市的A股股票为样本，分别检验首次发行股票的公司上市时（IPO时）股权集中度和上市后股权集中度与中小投资者法律保护的立法和执法之间的关系。实证结果发现，在我国股权集中度的下降不完全是中小投资者法律保护的结果，IPO发行制度的演变、与股权集中度相关的中小投资者法律保护的立法相对较少、政府对国有股权转让的严格管理、非国有控股公司在保持实际控制权的条件下减少控股比例以获取自身利益，也可能导致股权集中度的下降。
Using a sample from A-share firms listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges for the period 1990 to 2003, we examine the relationship between legal protection of minority shareholders and ownership concentration. The empirical results show that the decline of ownership concentration cannot be fully explained by the changes of laws and regulations concerning the protection of minority shareholders. The evolution of IPO rules, the limited number of regulations on minority protection, government~ s strict regulation on transfer of state-owned shares, and the desire to get more private benefits by non-state-controlling shareholders may also lead to the variation of ownership concentration.
出处
《经济学（季刊）》
2006年第3期893-922,共30页
China Economic Quarterly
基金
国家自然科学基金对本研究课题的资助（70502007）
