摘要
获益选择和博弈行为在美国台海政策决策中表现得比较明显。美国和台湾当局在博弈过程中既有绝对获益的选择,也有相对获益的考量。在“废统”问题上,陈水扁当局在美国反对的情况下执意“终统”,是双方博弈后作出的虽不满意但可以接受的相对最优战略选择,是出于绝对获益的考量。但“废统”的博弈模式无法改变美国“维持现状”政策的模糊性,无法消弥陈水扁当局重复博弈的可能性,也可能引发各方对相对获益的关切,从而不利于台海地区和平稳定局面的维护。
Gains choices and Games behavior play an important role in US decision-making process toward Taiwan Question. During the games, US and Taiwan authorities have both absolute and relative gains consideration. On the issue of ＂abolishing the NUC and NUG＂, despite the US objection, Chen Shui-bian authorities, insisted to cease the function of NCU and cease to apply the NUG. This was the result of games between US and Chen Shui-bian and the most acceptable preferential strategic choice. But the model of ＂abolishing the NUC and NUG＂ games cannot solve the problem of endangering the situation across the Taiwan Strait arousing by the ambiguous policy of ＂maintaining the status quo＂. Chen Shui-bian authorities may repeat the games, the other parties may pay more attention on relative gains and may trigger some conflict across the Taiwan strait.
出处
《台湾研究集刊》
CSSCI
2006年第2期16-23,共8页
Taiwan Research Journal
基金
985工程二期台湾研究创新基地课题成果
关键词
绝对获益
相对获益
维持现状
“废统”
Absolute Gains, Relative Gains, Maintaining Status quo, Abolishing the NUC and NUG
