摘要
改革开放以来,我国国有企业分配制度的改革已经从保障职能转向了激励职能,逐步形成了以经济利益为主导的激励机制。这种经济激励机制与被释放出来的人们追求经济利益的强烈动机相结合,使我国国有企业被迫走上了一条过度经济激励的轨道。从分析我国国有企业分配制度演进入手,探讨过度经济激励的形成原因,有助于调整国有企业分配方案,完善激励机制的基本思路。
Since China adopted the policy of Reform ＆ Opening Upto the Outside World, the reform of allocation insitution of state- owned enterprises has transformed its function from security to incentiue and gradually fromed the economic - oriented incentive mechanism. The combination of this economic incentive mechanism and the strong motivation of people pursuing economic benefit forces the state enterprises to walk up to the obrit of excessive economic incentive, This thesis begins with the analysia on the ecvelopment process of allocation instiution of state - owned enterprises, then discusses the forming reason of excessive economic incentive, and finally offers the adjustement scheme of the allocation of the state - owned enterprises and basic train of thought to improre the incentive mechanism.
出处
《现代财经（天津财经大学学报）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第7期36-39,共4页
Modern Finance and Economics：Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics
关键词
国有企业
分配制度
过度经济激励
State- owned Eenterprises
Allocation Institution
Excessive Economic Incentive
