摘要
尽管物权法定主义自罗马法以来被大陆法系国家普遍奉行,成为其物权法的基本原则。但该原则仍饱受质疑,对其存废问题一直争议不断。到了近代特别是20世纪以来,更是惨遭猛烈的批判,尤其是在日本和我国台湾,在祖国大陆否定者也不在少数。学者们的批判意见可归为废弃说和缓和说两类。通过对这些批判观点的检讨,发现并无力击倒物权法定主义,于是一一回应,边破边立,最后表明观点:必须继续坚持物权法定主义不能动摇,这是人类交易所需,是由物权的特性决定的,物权法定之“法”不能包括习惯法也不能从宽解释,仅指狭义的“法律”。以回答物权法定主义应向何处去(存或废)的问题。
Numerus clausus （no real right without law providing for it） has been largely observed in civil law countries since the establishment of Roman law and it has become a basic principle of real right law, but people have never stopped their attack against the principle and much has been debated about its maintenance. In modern times, especially since the twentieth century, it has become a target of fierce criticism, especially in Japan and Taiwan province. Many scholars in mainland of China also assume a negative attitude toward the principle. Academic criticism can be generally divided in two categories ： maintenance or discard of the principle. After examination, this author finds no reason offered by the critical positions that can justify abrogation of numerus clausus. Accordingly, in answering the question whether we shall hold or discard numerus clausus, this author furnishes an affirmative reply, which is conducive to transactions of mankind and is consistent with characteristics of real right. Of course, the law providing for real right does not include customary law, nor can it be liberally interpreted. It only refers to law in a Harrow sense.
出处
《西南政法大学学报》
2006年第2期41-51,共11页
Journal of Southwest University of Political Science and Law
关键词
物权法定主义
批判
检讨
numerus clausus
criticize
examine
