摘要
投保人需要一个“代理人”,在保险公司绩效不佳时对其实施有效的外部干预。而政府对保险公司治理问题的介入,首要的目的正是保护广大的被保险方利益,也就是为投保人充任“代理人”,这为投保人对保险企业实施外部干预和有效控制提供了理论依据。对保险公司的干预,更重要的是能够对保险公司日常的经营产生“硬约束”,这种硬约束能够影响到对经营者的激励。政府的这样一种地位,必然要求保险公司摒弃“股东倾向”,从而接受兼顾债权人利益的“共同治理”理念。
The applicant needs an ＂agent＂ exerting a profound role of exterior interference on the related insurance company when it＇s performance get worsening. While the utmost goal of the government to intervene in the governance of the insurance company, that is to perform as an agent or regulator of the applicant, is to protect largely the benefits of the insured, which construct the theoretical gist of the applicant＇s exterior interference and effective control on the insurance company. The accomplishment of the joint governance and exterior interference lies on the form of the hard constraint conditions on the operation of the insurance company, which offers incentives to the managers of the insurance company. We hold in this paper that the manager of the insurance company should reject the stock holder＇s inclination in the regular operation and accept the idea of joint governance.
出处
《武汉大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
CSSCI
2006年第2期175-179,共5页
Wuhan University Journal：Philosophy & Social Science
关键词
保险公司
共同治理
政府角色
立宪活动
insurance regulation
stock holder＇s inclinationt joint governance
public policy
constitutionalism
