摘要
结合我国电力工业改革的实际情况,将激励理论引入可选择的电力远期合同研究领域,并结合最优化理论建立了独立发电商和电力公司之间的激励性可中断供电管理模型。在该模型中,电力公司在每个时段可根据实时情况确定合同价格和供电中断分配方法。该模型不仅可以引导独立发电商积极地参与中断管理,而且使得电力公司和独立发电商都能够获得一定的利润收益。最后通过算例仿真说明了该方法的有效性。
According to the actual situation of power industry reformation in China, the theory of incentives is led into the research area of optional long-term forward contract of electric power and combining with optimization theory a model for incentive interruptible power supply management between independent power generation companies and utility is proposed. In this model at each time interval the utility can determine contract price and dispatch method of power supply interruption. Such a management method not only can induce independent power generation companies to participate the management of power supply interruption actively, but also make both utility and power generation companies obtaining definite benefits. The effectiveness of the proposed method is proved by simulation results.
出处
《电网技术》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2006年第4期69-73,共5页
Power System Technology
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(50107006)~~上海市教委科技发展基金项目(05AZ28)上海市重点学科建设资助项目(T0103)
关键词
独立发电商
激励理论
可中断供电合同
机制设计
蒙特卡罗模拟方法
电力市场
Independent power produeer
Theory of incentives
Interruptible power supply contracts
Mechanism design
Monte Carlo simulation method
Electricity market
