摘要
研究不同规模两公司在一维有限线性市场上的选址博弈问题.首先修改HOTELLING原始模型的“费用函数”假设,建立不同规模两公司的选址博弈模型;然后介绍了一家大型公司投入一家店、另一家小型公司投入多家连锁店的竞争系统;通过应用该选址博弈模型,解得该系统的一个STACKELBERG平衡解:大公司的店在市场中央,小公司的店按“无缝配置”依次对称分布于市场两侧;最后,在平衡的前提下,讨论连锁小公司和大公司选址博弈时应采取的策略.
This paper presents a location game between a large finn and a small finn in a linear market. Firstly, the model of location game between different-scale 2-firms is set up by adapting the assumption of cost function in Hotelling model. Secondly, the competitive system is introduced, in which one store belongs to a large finn and the others belong to a small finn. Thirdly, the stackelberg equillibrium of this system, the large firm＇ s store is located in the center of market and the small finn gathers its stores at the ends of market symmetrically, is solved as the solution of new model. Finally, several strategic decisions of a small finn which games with a large finn are given under the Stackelberg equilibrium.
出处
《系统工程理论与实践》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2006年第2期77-82,共6页
Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
