摘要
传统理论认为,低的信息透明度不利于买卖双方之间达成交易,无法实现资源在市场中的最优化配置,而提高信息的透明度将有利于改变这一局面。本文通过博弈论方法分析低信息透明度和高信息透明度分别对传统交易场和B2B交易场的负面影响作用,认为,高信息透明度对于在线交易并非完全是一件有益之事。在此基础上,本文提出了降低高信息透明度负面影响作用的方法。
A traditional theory holds the belief that lower degree of information transparency is harmful to precipitate the trade between venders and vendees, and efficient allocation of resources cannot be achieved in the market. But this problem can be resolved by raising the degree of information transparency. In this paper, the author takes advantage of game theory to analyze the side impact exerted by lower and higher degree of information transparency on traditional and B2B exchange, respectively, and shed light on the point that higher degree of information transparency is not completely helpful to the B2B exchange. Finally, based on the analysis above, the author seeks to bring forward some measures implemented to relieve the side impact.
出处
《南开管理评论》
CSSCI
2005年第5期88-92,112,共6页
Nankai Business Review
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究"十五"规划课题"企业对企业营销管理问题研究"(批准号:01JD630006)
南开大学文科创新基金项目(批准号:NMC0528)的阶段性成果
