摘要
文章基于心理学和委托代理理论,探讨了国有企业经营者激励现状,认为国有企业存在显性激励不足、隐性激励有余和负激励缺乏等问题。国有企业经营者显性激励不足导致其动力缺乏,而负激励缺失更导致经营者偷懒和机会主义行为。负激励的极端——“油锅合同”能够对经营者形成一种威慑,杜绝或防止经营者的道德风险,促使经营者努力工作。
Based on Psychology and the theory of Principal-Agent, this paper analyzes the current situation of incentives of Chinese state-owned enterprises＇ managers and finds the phenomena of lack of apparent incentives and absence of negative incentives. Lack of apperent incentives leads to shortage of motivity. Furthermore, absence of negative incentives may produce laziness and opportunism. The extremeness of negative incentives （boil-in-oil contract） can give managers a threat, preventing them from moral hazard and urging them to work hard
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第9期114-123,共10页
Journal of Finance and Economics
基金
教育部人文社科"十五"规划项目(OIJA6300061)合肥工业大学博士点基金(20040359004)
关键词
负激励
油锅合同
偷懒
negative ineentive
boil-in-oil eontraet
lazy behavior
