摘要
国有企业产权转让的难点是产权的定价。就大水桥糖厂产权拍卖的案例,在假设竞争的并购企业之间、成功的并购者和目标企业之间关于协同效应与战略关系的信息不完美,利用实物期权博弈论方法,分别就完全竞争和垄断研究生产函数为Cobb-Douglas函数情形的企业并购的时间和条件。模型应用于国有企业产权转让的定价,给出国有资产相对流失和绝对流失的定义,分析了影响资产流失大小的主要因素。研究表明:企业产权的价格不等于资产的价格。国有资产流失主要受三种因素影响:一是目标企业本身的特征,二是目标企业所在产业的特征,三是并购的“沉没成本”大小。建立全国性规范的产权交易市场,由市场决定企业产权的价格才会有效防止国有资产的流失。
The difficulty of property right transfer of state-owned enterprise is pricing. Incorporating imperfect information about synergy gains, strategic interaction among competing bidders, and between the successful bidder and the target firm, managerial hubris, this paper presents a model of acquisitions with a Cobb-Douglas production function by using a game-theoretic real option approach. The model can be used for the pricing of property right transfer of state-owned enterprise. The definitions of assets relative lost and absolute lost of state-owned enterprise are given. Research results show that the price of property right transfer of state-owned enterprise is not equal to the price of assets of target firm. The assets lost is influenced by three factors: the output price elasticity of the equity value of target firm, the industry characteristics and sunk cost of merger. We should establish, by opening market pricing, a whole country and a normal property right exchange market to prevent state-owned enterprises from losing assets.
出处
《管理评论》
2005年第6期44-49,64,共7页
Management Review
基金
广东省自然科学基金资助项目(031635)。
