摘要
良知是指道德理性的内在凝结与知能化表现而言。良知之“能”主要体现着道德理性对现实世界的观照与统摄作用;其“不能”则体现着良知与现实世界的隔离性与超越性。从孟子到张载到王阳明,良知一直沿着“能”的方向发展,至阳明弟子徐爱,始有“不能”的追究。从历史的角度看,良知“能”与“不能”的界限呈现出不断变化的色彩:先秦的“不能”,至宋明而成为“能”,张载的“能”,至阳明又成为“不能”,而至熊十力复又成为“能”,其“能”的界限始终随着主体的体认度与认同度的深化而不断拓展,并且也始终是以“不能”作为其“能”的前提基础与现实支撑的。
Innate knowledge refers to internal fossilization and intellectual expression of one’s moral rational. The “can” of innate knowledge indicates the moral concern and control over the realistic world whereas the “cannot” of it expresses the isolation and transcendence of the reality. Mencius, Zhang Zai and Wang Yangming all exploited the issue of the “can” of innate knowledge, but Xu Ai, a pupil of Wang Yangming, started the tradition of exploring that of the “cannot” of it. From a historical perspective, the boundaries between “can” and “cannot” of innate knowledge showed the indication of steadily varying. The issue of the “cannot” was the common academic concern in the Pre-Qin days but the “can” rose as the main concern in the Song and the Ming Dynasty. Zhang Zai showed interest in the “can” while Wang Yangming in the “cannot”. The situation remained until Xiong Shili who concentrated his study on the “can”. Varying as the academic focus has been on the issue, the frontiers of the “can” of innate knowledge have always been extending with deepening of the subject’s experience and acceptation, and with the “cannot” as the prerequisite and realistic basis of the “can”.
出处
《陕西师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第3期13-19,共7页
Journal of Shaanxi Normal University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)
关键词
良知
道德理性
能
不能
innate knowledge
moral rational
“can”
“cannot”