摘要
在考虑固定的R&D预算下,在一个两个参与人的无限期博弈模型中,参与人选择波动性低或高的行动战略,参与人的支付水平为其产品与竞争对手产品的质量差异。在均衡的条件下,领先者会选择较为保守的战略,而追随者会选择风险战略。
This paper considers an infinite-period game that the tow players make a choice between low and high variance tactics,under the limitation of fixed R&D budget.And the players' payoff ability is a function of product quality difference in the competition.It proves that in equilibrium the leader chooses a safe strategy and the follower a risky one,thus formalizing the sports intuition that the follower has nothing to win.
出处
《商业研究》
北大核心
2005年第8期15-18,共4页
Commercial Research
关键词
R&D
博弈
效用函数
支付水平
均衡
R&D
game
value function
payoff function
equilibrium
