摘要
本体论哲学有着难以克服的认识论难题。尽管近代哲学自觉地把认识论问题作为自己讨论的中心课题,但认识论难题依然以变样的二元分立方式挥之不去。因此,对于胡塞尔来说,进行认识批判就意味以现象学直观的方式超越哲学史上形形色色的二元分立模式。沟通一般与个别、超越主—客关系模式的本质直观之所以可能,是因为在其中隐匿地发生着意向行为的赋义过程。这种赋义之所以不是主观唯心主义,是因为在内在时间中纯粹体验总是超出了"原初印象"。这样,在胡塞尔看来,"认识"并不是一个可以盛装外在对象的空口袋,相反,每一原初明证的直观就是确切意义上的认识。
Ontology has some unconquerable difficult problems on the theory of knowledge. Though modern philosophy takes epistemology as the core of its discussion for granted, the problems are still unconquerable. So, to Husserl, knowledge critique means exceeding historical dualism in epistemology by his Phenomenological intuition. This Phenomenological intuition is not subjectivism because in inner consciousness noesis will appear when the noema accrue. Meanwhile, in the eyes of Husserl, 'knowledge' is not an empty bag, on the contrary, every initial intuition is actually the meaning of knowledge.
出处
《江苏科技大学学报（社会科学版）》
2004年第4期12-16,共5页
Journal of Jiangsu University of Science and Technology(Social Science Edition)
基金
江苏大学人文社科基金项目(JDR2003016)
关键词
认识论
胡塞尔
解答方法
本体论
puzzle of epistemology
Edmund Husserl
answer
