摘要
本文从山西票号商权分离出现的委托—代理关系入手,阐述了维系这种委代关系的激励和约束机制。票号激励机制中的人力股制度有确定、计量和分配三个方面的基本内容,而约束机制则体现在制定号规,以及基于儒家文化上的信任和忠诚方面。文章给出了儒家文化价值体系下票号委代关系的数学分析模型,并对现代企业人力资本管理中所需解决的问题提出了建议。
The principalagent relationship appeared after the separation of ownership and management in the Shanxi draft banks. In this paper, we discuss the incentivecompatibility and constraint mechanism that can maintain this principalagent relationship. The human resource share system, which is practiced in the incentivecompatibility mechanism, has three basic contents: confirming, measuring and allocating. The constraint mechanism embodies not only the regulations in the draft banks but also the trust and loyalty on the basis of the Confucianism, a kind of important informal institution in ancient china. We also present a mathematical model to show how much the collectivism will influence the draft banks under the circumstance of Confucianism. According to this model, we put forward some suggestions for the human capital management of the modern enterprises.
出处
《上海财经大学学报》
2005年第1期48-53,共6页
Journal of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
