摘要
由于风险投资中存在着信息不对称,从而造成风险投资家和风险企业之间签约之前的“逆向选择”和签约之后的“道德风险”问题。探讨了这种委托—代理风险的防范措施,并且简要分析了我国目前实施此类措施中应该注意的问题。
The asymmetry of information on venture capital market amuses a series of principal-agent problem between the venture capitalist and entrepreneur. The author mainly discusses the possible solutions against such principal-agent risk, along with the the relevant problems that should be considered during implementation in China.
出处
《科技创业月刊》
2007年第3期52-53,共2页
Journal of Entrepreneurship in Science & Technology
关键词
风险投资
委托-代理
信息不对称
风险防范
venture capital, principle-agent, asymmetry of information, avoidance of risk
