摘要
针对投资银行投资风险的复杂系统建模,进行系统动态模型设计。通过模型分析及最优解证明可得出,当投资银行和贷款企业博弈冲突难以调和时,双方均应改变系统内的性能指标,而使系统解为最优解。
Aiming at the complicated and systematic model of investment bank and investment risks, this paper carried out the systematic and dynamic modelling. Rushing the proof of the model analysis and the optional solution, the next conclusion can be drawn: when game appears conflicts and hard in harmony, the both parties should change the function index in the system to make the system solution optimal.
出处
《软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2004年第6期34-38,共5页
Soft Science
基金
陕西省自然科学基金资助项目(2001G09)
关键词
博弈
建模
最优解
game
modelling
the optimal solution
