摘要
在道德风险问题的委托代理关系中 ,委托人对代理人行动的监督与对自然状态的观测所起的效果是等价的。本文考虑到委托人对自然状态的观测成本 ,提出了“状态观测模型” ,并对信息不对称问题作了贝叶斯分析 ,讨论了不同观测力度对代理人努力水平、风险成本和代理成本等的作用。本文还给出了委托人愿意对自然状态进行观测的条件 -“愿意观测集。”
In the principle-agent problem with moral hazard, the observation of the state of nature has the same effect with the monitoring of agent's action. Considering the cost of observation, this paper puts forward the state-observation model and analyzes the informational asymmetry with Baysian theorem. Then we discuss the impacts of different observation level on agent's effort, risky cost and agency cost, etc. At the end of this paper, we present the condition that principle would like to observe the state of nature.
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
2000年第3期33-38,共6页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金!资助项目(79770053)
关键词
委托代理
信息不对称
监督
道德风险
激励
principle-agent problem
informational asymmetry
baysian theorem
monitor
