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信息获取有代价情形下的激励机制设计 被引量:2

Incentive Mechanism Design with Individual Having Information Costs
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摘要 分析了激励机制设计的问题背景,介绍了机制以及机制设计的基本概念,然后借助这些概念,介绍了本文讨论的核心——Groves-Clarke机制,介绍了它的背景、构成及性质,并进一步分析了它在个体获取信息成本的假设上存在的不足,进而对个体获取信息的成本作了假设,即如果投入一定的资源,则可以获得信息;分析了在这个假设条件下的机制设计面临的新问题,提出了解决的思路。 Firstly,the background of incentive mechanism design problem is investigated.Then,the basic concepts involved in incentive mechanism and its design are introduced.With these concepts,Groves Clarke mechanism is introduced,and its background,structure and property are illustrated.The flaws in this mechanisms assumption concerning information costs are further analyzed and pointed out,and assumption about the individuals information costs is made that they can get information by spending a certain amount of money on information gathering activities.The new problem concerning mechanism design with this assumption is analyzed,and the process of finding the solution is illustrated,through which detailed analyses are given.
出处 《决策与决策支持系统》 1997年第2期65-72,共8页
关键词 Groves-Clarke机制 公共决策 激励机制 激励机制设计 : Groves Clarke mechanism,public decision making,incentive mechanism,incentive mechanism design
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