摘要
基于博弈论与Jones模型,通过博弈论分析审计全过程后发现审计双方存在着带有可信承诺的博弈,因此当期审计意见有可能影响当期盈余管理。面板数据格兰杰因果检验进一步验证了盈余管理与审计意见两者互为因果关系,即盈余管理不仅会影响审计意见,审计意见也会影响盈余管理。之后的分组回归结果显示,2007年之前审计意见对盈余管理的影响并不显著,但2007年之后审计意见显著影响了盈余管理,这说明风险导向审计准则的实施增强了审计师的博弈能力,使审计意见能够通过可信承诺的方式显著压缩可控应计利润,提高了审计质量。
Based on the game theory and the Jones model,this paper used the game theory to analyze the whole process of audit rather than the audit reporting process,and found that auditors and quoted companies have game relationships on credible commitment,so the current audit opinion may have an obvious impact on earnings management.Then the panel-data Granger Test verified the causal relationship between earnings management and audit opinion,which means earnings management would affect the audit opinion,and vice versa.Further grouped regression results found that before 2007,audit opinion had no significant influence on earnings management,but after 2007,the audit opinion engendered significant influence on the earnings management.This result indicated that the implementation of risk-oriented auditing standards enhanced the game ability of auditors,as it ensured the audit opinion to compress discretionary accruals by the credible commitment,and then ultimately improved the audit quality.
出处
《南京审计学院学报》
2013年第5期88-97,共10页
journal of nanjing audit university
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71162006)
