摘要
后期维特根斯坦认为 ,意义既不是词的所指 ,也不是名称本身的承担者 ,既不是使用词时的心理内容 ,也不是心理过程 ;词的意义即用法 ,是它在语言实践中的使用 ,词和语句只有在语言游戏中才能获得意义。作为一种破旧立新的语用学构想 ,维氏的用法论和意义整体论无疑具有方法论的指导意义 ,但维氏囿于绝对意义论的语言观 ,试图在不定中追求确定 ,认为词的意义总是确定的。这显然需要否定和批判。
The later Wittgenstein suggests that the meaning of a word is not its reference, or the holder of a name perse. Neither is it the mental content or mental process of one's using the word. The meaning of a word is nothing but its use in language practice, and the meaning of a word or sentence is acquired only in actual language games. Abrand-new pragmatic framework, Wittgenstein's holistic theory of use is sure to be methodologically significant. But, limited to his linguistic view of absolute meaning, Wittgenstein tries to pursue definiteness in an indefinite context, holding that the meaning of a word is definite all the time. Undoubtedly, this needs to be negated and criticized.
出处
《重庆工学院学报》
2002年第2期103-105,共3页
Journal of Chongqing Institute of Technology
