摘要
本文在一个政府-企业两期完全信息动态博弈的框架下,考察了存在技术差异的两国进行异质性商品贸易时的均衡关税选择,以及这种技术差异如何影响双边关税减让所释放的福利在两国间和各国内的分配模式。本文分析表明:当贸易品替代性较弱时,技术占优国家倾向于设置更低的关税;而当替代性较强时,结果则恰好相反。在一个商品间交叉价格弹性为零的条件下,双边关税同等减让会使由贸易自由化引致的福利增进向拥有技术优势的国家倾斜,而平衡减让则会使技术相对落后的国家获利更多。对特定国家而言,总体福利的增长总是以关税收入的减少为代价,而额外福利在企业和消费者之间的分配则由关税减让的方式和两国的相对技术水平共同决定。
Under a framework involving government-firm two-period dynamic game of complete information,this paper studied tariff choices of two countries with technological difference when they traded with each other by heterogeneous goods in equilibrium,and how such a difference impacted the inter-and intra-country distribution pattern of welfare released by bilateral tariff concession.The results show that the country with technological advantage tends to set lower tariff when substitutability of tradable goods is weak,and the opposite is right if substitutability becomes sufficiently strong.In a case with zero crossprice elasticity for each goods,equivalent tariff concession biases welfare promotion induced by trade liberalization for the technologically advanced country,while the country with laggard technology obtains more benefits from balanced tariff concession.As for a specific country,overall welfare growth is always at the cost of reduction in tariff revenue,while the distribution of extra welfare between firms and consumers is jointly determined by the manner of tariff concession and relative technology level.
作者
吴屹帆
黄先海
WU Yifan;HUANG Xianhai
出处
《国际贸易问题》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第2期1-15,共15页
Journal of International Trade
关键词
关税
福利
等福利曲线
同等减让
平衡减让
Tariff
Welfare
Equal Welfare Curve
Equivalent Concession
Balanced Concession
