摘要
在胡塞尔的内时间意识现象学中,滞留是再回忆的基础。但是这个理论面临着三方面的问题。第一,滞留本身的连续性是成问题的,不能为其成为再回忆的基础提供支撑。第二,滞留与原印象之间是断裂的,同时,试图为滞留与原印象的连续寻找潜意识、神经现象学基础的方式也难以解释滞留的连续性,从而否了滞留作为再回忆的基础。第三,胡塞尔对于滞留的反思性分析说明了再回忆反而是滞留的显现条件,而且这种设定抽象滞留时间的连续性的方式与意识现象学的先验还原相违背。所以,滞留不能作为再回忆的基础。
In Husserl’s phenomenology of internal time consciousness,retention is the basis of recollection.But this theory faces three problems.First,the continuity of retention itself is problematic and cannot provide support for it to become the basis of recollection.Second,there is a fracture between retention and original impression.At the same time,it’s difficult to explain the continuity of retention by trying to find subconscious,neurophenomenological foundation for the continuity of retention and original impression.Third,Husserl’s reflective analysis shows that recollection is far from being the basis of detention,but it is the manifestation condition of detention.Moreover,the way of setting the continuity of abstract detention time is contrary to the transcendental reduction of phenomenology of consciousness.Therefore,in the phenomenology of time consciousness,retention cannot be the basis of recollection.
作者
刘少明
LIU Shao-ming(School of Marxism,Fudan University,Shanghai 200433,China)
出处
《科学技术哲学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第6期22-28,共7页
Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目“《资本论》及其手稿中的时间哲学研究”(22YJC710039)
关键词
滞留
再回忆
基础
矛盾
retention
recollection
foundation
contradiction
