摘要
近年来,穿越人口密集区管道的泄漏爆炸事故频发,如2013年青岛"11.22"输油管道爆炸事故以及2019年墨西哥"1.18"输油管道爆炸事故,均人员伤亡惨重、经济损失巨大,也直接突显出风险直接受害者(公众群体)、管道直接受益者(企业)和地区宏观调控者(政府)三方之间的矛盾。本文利用博弈论原理,对政府、企业和公众在穿越人口密集区长输管道方面存在的风险进行详细论述,利用纳什均衡定性博弈理论、柯布—道格拉斯函数和三方投入定量模型计算出三方对管道的保护投入,结合定性和定量方法阐述三方在管道保护上承担的风险和投入。得到只有公众、企业和政府三方同时进行事故风险投入,才能最好地预防事故发生,降低社会成本,促进地区综合发展。
In recent years,the accidents of pipeline through populated regions occur more and more frequently,such as the Qingdao pipeline explosion accident in 2013 and just occurred the Mexico pipeline explosion accident in 2019.These accidents caused heavy casualties and huge economic losses.It leads the conflict among the direct victims of risk(public groups)and the direct beneficiaries(enterprises)and the regional macro-regulators(governments).The paper describes the risk of tripartite in protecting the pipeline across the city and the measures they take to avoid accidents.Using the scientific theories proves that only the three participants take the accident investment together can avoid the accident and promote development of the entire region.
作者
段安琪
陶建中
李玉坤
Duan Anqi;Tao Jianzhong;Li Yukun(Sinopec Marketing South China Company,Guangzhou,Guangdong 510000,China;China national petroleum corporation western pipeline Co.Ltd.,Urumqi,Xinjiang 830000,China;China University of Petroleum(East China),Qingdao,Shandong 266580,China)
出处
《世界石油工业》
2019年第2期59-64,共6页
World Petroleum Industry
基金
中国石油科技创新基金项目(2017D-5007-0605)资助
关键词
人口密集区
长输管道
博弈论
风险管控
populated regions
long-distance pipeline
game theory
risk management and control
