摘要
过去公司治理的中心是以货币资本为基础的所有者与经营者关系的界定 ,而目前公司治理的中心则是以货币资本和人力资本共同为基础的两种资本相互关系的界定。主要集中在对人力资本的激励和约束机制的研究上。本文运用动态博弈分析的方法 ,试图构建我国银行高层经营管理者激励约束机制的动态模型。通过确立最优激励因子来激励和约束银行高层经营管理者 ,使之将自身利益与银行长远发展相结合 ,实现银行经营收入最大化。
In the past, what the corporate governance focused on was the definition of the relationship between the owner and the operator on the basis of monetary capital, while nowadays on the definition of the correlation between the two kinds of the capital on the basis of both monetary capital and human capital. Using the dynamic game analysis, this paper makes an attempt in building a dynamic model of incentive and control mechanism for high-level managers and points out that by establishing the optimized incentive factors, the high-level managers will combine their own interests and the long-term bank prosperity, thus achieving the maximization of bank return.
出处
《当代经济科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2004年第4期31-35,共5页
Modern Economic Science
关键词
商业银行
高层经营管理者
激励机制
约束机制
中国
commercial bank
high-level managers
incentive and control mechanism
dynamic model
