The concept of supervenience advanced by D.Davidson to expound his anomolas monism is used to present both the dependent and independent relation between mental and physical properties. In Concepts of Supervenience,J....The concept of supervenience advanced by D.Davidson to expound his anomolas monism is used to present both the dependent and independent relation between mental and physical properties. In Concepts of Supervenience,J.Kim claimed that there are three different concepts of supervenience:the weak,the strong and the global,and demonstrated that the strong supervenience is equivalent to the global one. One year later,J.Kim corrected an error in the earlier paper,and held that the strong supervenience is stronger than the global,and the weak is independent of the global. Based on a brief introduction about J.Kim’s theory of supervenience,this paper contends that J.Kim’s conclusion about the relationship between the weak supervenience and the global one is wrong,and corrects some improper points in his formulation of and arguments about the strong and weak supervenience.展开更多
The concepts of Emergence and reduction have three types. Two of them are workable while one of them is not. The two types of workable emergences are emergence of wholeness and emergence of function meaning. The forme...The concepts of Emergence and reduction have three types. Two of them are workable while one of them is not. The two types of workable emergences are emergence of wholeness and emergence of function meaning. The former is natural workable and the latter is artificial workable. The two types of workable reduction are structural reduction and formalized elemental reduction. The former is natural workable and the latter is artificial workable. The concept of supervenient emergence held by Davidson amounts to the concept of emergence of function meaning, while the concept of functional reduction held by Kim amounts to the concept of structural reduction. Both of them are workable, and thus should be mutually complementary but not opposite. Combining the workable concepts of emergence-reduction, a new solution of the mind-body problem will be given. We can study the workable concepts of emergence and reduction regardless of the natural or artificial from two angles of view——science and philosophy.展开更多
The importance of downward causation lies in its showing that functional properties,including mental properties,are real,although they can’t be reduced into physical properties. Kim rejects non-reductive physicalism,...The importance of downward causation lies in its showing that functional properties,including mental properties,are real,although they can’t be reduced into physical properties. Kim rejects non-reductive physicalism,including the leading functionalism by eliminating downward causation,and thereby returns to reductionism. This paper tries to make a distinction between the two aspects of function which are functional meaning and functional structure,and claim further that functional meaning can’t be reduced into material level,but functional structure can do. Because of the subject of functional meaning to functional structure,so called downward causation is indeed a relation between the whole of function and its factors of structure,i.e.,not a relation of levels in general,but of whole-part. As a result,due to this understanding of downward causation as well as my abandoning of the principle of physical causal closure,Kim’s argument becomes invalid. Thus,this paper retains Davidson’s view of ontological monism and conceptual dualism,and puts forward causal holism as a complement with them.展开更多
文摘The concept of supervenience advanced by D.Davidson to expound his anomolas monism is used to present both the dependent and independent relation between mental and physical properties. In Concepts of Supervenience,J.Kim claimed that there are three different concepts of supervenience:the weak,the strong and the global,and demonstrated that the strong supervenience is equivalent to the global one. One year later,J.Kim corrected an error in the earlier paper,and held that the strong supervenience is stronger than the global,and the weak is independent of the global. Based on a brief introduction about J.Kim’s theory of supervenience,this paper contends that J.Kim’s conclusion about the relationship between the weak supervenience and the global one is wrong,and corrects some improper points in his formulation of and arguments about the strong and weak supervenience.
文摘The concepts of Emergence and reduction have three types. Two of them are workable while one of them is not. The two types of workable emergences are emergence of wholeness and emergence of function meaning. The former is natural workable and the latter is artificial workable. The two types of workable reduction are structural reduction and formalized elemental reduction. The former is natural workable and the latter is artificial workable. The concept of supervenient emergence held by Davidson amounts to the concept of emergence of function meaning, while the concept of functional reduction held by Kim amounts to the concept of structural reduction. Both of them are workable, and thus should be mutually complementary but not opposite. Combining the workable concepts of emergence-reduction, a new solution of the mind-body problem will be given. We can study the workable concepts of emergence and reduction regardless of the natural or artificial from two angles of view——science and philosophy.
文摘The importance of downward causation lies in its showing that functional properties,including mental properties,are real,although they can’t be reduced into physical properties. Kim rejects non-reductive physicalism,including the leading functionalism by eliminating downward causation,and thereby returns to reductionism. This paper tries to make a distinction between the two aspects of function which are functional meaning and functional structure,and claim further that functional meaning can’t be reduced into material level,but functional structure can do. Because of the subject of functional meaning to functional structure,so called downward causation is indeed a relation between the whole of function and its factors of structure,i.e.,not a relation of levels in general,but of whole-part. As a result,due to this understanding of downward causation as well as my abandoning of the principle of physical causal closure,Kim’s argument becomes invalid. Thus,this paper retains Davidson’s view of ontological monism and conceptual dualism,and puts forward causal holism as a complement with them.
