针对能源电力系统的优化管理与控制问题,提出了一种信息物理融合的智慧能源系统(Intelligent energy systems,IES)多级对等协同优化方法.在信息物理融合能源系统(Cyber-physical energy systems, CPES)的基础上,构建了智慧能源系统的局...针对能源电力系统的优化管理与控制问题,提出了一种信息物理融合的智慧能源系统(Intelligent energy systems,IES)多级对等协同优化方法.在信息物理融合能源系统(Cyber-physical energy systems, CPES)的基础上,构建了智慧能源系统的局域和广域两级协同优化架构.综合考虑产消者能源实体对等交互过程中的社会福利、供求平衡和需求意愿等因素,基于Stone-Geary函数和双向拍卖机制构建了智慧能源系统能量优化模型,给出了通过收敛判定域引导的全局随机寻优与区域定向寻优策略,有效地提高了算法的局部搜索能力.此外,通过双向拍卖机制的理性定价以及智能合约的辅助服务,有效地实现了用户友好的对等交易模式.仿真实例表明,在社会福利最大化的前提下可获得产消者电力资源最优分配结果,进一步验证了本文方法的有效性和可行性.展开更多
The double moral hazard of ＂company ＋ farmer＂ and the time preference cost of company and farmer was analyzed. According to static game model, it re-vealed that the reason for low compliance rate of ＂company ＋ fa...The double moral hazard of ＂company ＋ farmer＂ and the time preference cost of company and farmer was analyzed. According to static game model, it re-vealed that the reason for low compliance rate of ＂company ＋ farmer＂ model was the existence of market risk, namely, the fluctuation of market price, and the stable market price in contracts was actualy a kind of interval, instead of a specific value. Furthermore, the effect of default penalty, market transaction cost and time prefer-ence cost on the stability of contract was studied. The results showed that default penalty, market transaction cost and time preference cost had positive influence on the price interval range of a contract.展开更多
文摘针对能源电力系统的优化管理与控制问题,提出了一种信息物理融合的智慧能源系统(Intelligent energy systems,IES)多级对等协同优化方法.在信息物理融合能源系统(Cyber-physical energy systems, CPES)的基础上,构建了智慧能源系统的局域和广域两级协同优化架构.综合考虑产消者能源实体对等交互过程中的社会福利、供求平衡和需求意愿等因素,基于Stone-Geary函数和双向拍卖机制构建了智慧能源系统能量优化模型,给出了通过收敛判定域引导的全局随机寻优与区域定向寻优策略,有效地提高了算法的局部搜索能力.此外,通过双向拍卖机制的理性定价以及智能合约的辅助服务,有效地实现了用户友好的对等交易模式.仿真实例表明,在社会福利最大化的前提下可获得产消者电力资源最优分配结果,进一步验证了本文方法的有效性和可行性.
基金Supported by Humanities and Social Sciences of Ministry of Education(12YJC630050)Soft Science Bidding Project of Ministry of Agriculture(20140203)+1 种基金Jiangxi Soft Science Fund(20141BBA10065)Jiangxi’s Jiangxi Provincial Education Department(GJJ13727)~~
文摘The double moral hazard of ＂company ＋ farmer＂ and the time preference cost of company and farmer was analyzed. According to static game model, it re-vealed that the reason for low compliance rate of ＂company ＋ farmer＂ model was the existence of market risk, namely, the fluctuation of market price, and the stable market price in contracts was actualy a kind of interval, instead of a specific value. Furthermore, the effect of default penalty, market transaction cost and time prefer-ence cost on the stability of contract was studied. The results showed that default penalty, market transaction cost and time preference cost had positive influence on the price interval range of a contract.
