This article analyses on why China Mobile and China Unicom have chosen price war rather than tacit collusion these years. On the basis of the analysis on factors that influence tacit collusion, and combined with the f...This article analyses on why China Mobile and China Unicom have chosen price war rather than tacit collusion these years. On the basis of the analysis on factors that influence tacit collusion, and combined with the facts of wireless communication market, the author suggests that the market asymmetries, cost asymmetries, and product differentiation are the basic factors, which trigger price competition between the Chinese wireless operators. By constructing a game model based on Chum rate, this article discusses how these factors cause a fight between the operators and how vigorous the price competition will be. At last, the author suggests that to keep vigor in this industry, continuous structural adjustment is essential. Besides, the number portability policies may cause tacit collusion.展开更多
This paper studies the case of the collusive price of the hotel industry in Kunming by economically analyzingthe unsustainability of the collusive price and instability of collusive organizations, doubts about the col...This paper studies the case of the collusive price of the hotel industry in Kunming by economically analyzingthe unsustainability of the collusive price and instability of collusive organizations, doubts about the collusive behavior,and thinks that the collusive price is not helpful to the development of tourism industry, the pillar industry in YunnanProvince.展开更多
文摘This article analyses on why China Mobile and China Unicom have chosen price war rather than tacit collusion these years. On the basis of the analysis on factors that influence tacit collusion, and combined with the facts of wireless communication market, the author suggests that the market asymmetries, cost asymmetries, and product differentiation are the basic factors, which trigger price competition between the Chinese wireless operators. By constructing a game model based on Chum rate, this article discusses how these factors cause a fight between the operators and how vigorous the price competition will be. At last, the author suggests that to keep vigor in this industry, continuous structural adjustment is essential. Besides, the number portability policies may cause tacit collusion.
文摘This paper studies the case of the collusive price of the hotel industry in Kunming by economically analyzingthe unsustainability of the collusive price and instability of collusive organizations, doubts about the collusive behavior,and thinks that the collusive price is not helpful to the development of tourism industry, the pillar industry in YunnanProvince.
