针对区域综合能源系统(regional integrated energy system,RIES)集中式优化调度方法不能揭示供能方与需求侧利益的缺陷,为了深入挖掘用户需求侧的可调节潜能,考虑到能量平衡约束和若干设备运行约束,提出了一种考虑需求侧资源参与的区...针对区域综合能源系统(regional integrated energy system,RIES)集中式优化调度方法不能揭示供能方与需求侧利益的缺陷,为了深入挖掘用户需求侧的可调节潜能,考虑到能量平衡约束和若干设备运行约束,提出了一种考虑需求侧资源参与的区域综合能源系统低碳协同调度模型。首先设置能源系统运营商(energy system operator,ESO)作为领导者,以收益最大化为目标为集群设定内部价格,下层的每个RIES作为追随者,对价格做出响应,并以最小化运行成本为目标建立了主从博弈模型;其次充分考虑电力、燃料、维护和碳交易成本的约束条件,在市场中引入碳交易机制限制二氧化碳排放,并采用差分演化(differential evolution,DE)的种群进化算法不断调整策略逼近博弈均衡;最后针对由三个系统组成的综合能源系统进行考虑需求侧资源参与的区域综合能源系统低碳协同调度分析,案例分析表明在博弈机制的激励下可以优化分布式能源装置的产出,降低运行成本,从而实现多主体利益平衡下的集群协调优化。展开更多
The interprovincial trade embodied carbon emissions plays an important role in the national emission reduction target among China's provinces. Furthermore, it will affect the smooth start-up of the national carbon...The interprovincial trade embodied carbon emissions plays an important role in the national emission reduction target among China's provinces. Furthermore, it will affect the smooth start-up of the national carbon trade market as well as the implementation of targets in 2030 for dealing with the climate change. Based on constructed MRIO model, this paper analyzes the embodied carbon emission trade flows among Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei and surrounding regions such as Shanxi, Shaanxi, and Inner Mongolia. The results indicate that six provinces have formed different patterns of carbon trade balance, where Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei provinces are in a deficit position, while the other three provinces are in a surplus position.Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei have transferred part of the carbon emissions to the other three provinces, which shows greater heterogeneity among various provinces and provincial different sectors. On basis of the conclusions, this paper puts forward some suggestions on provincial decomposition, responsibility distribution, and provincial collaborative reduction for national emission reduction targets.展开更多
文摘针对区域综合能源系统(regional integrated energy system,RIES)集中式优化调度方法不能揭示供能方与需求侧利益的缺陷,为了深入挖掘用户需求侧的可调节潜能,考虑到能量平衡约束和若干设备运行约束,提出了一种考虑需求侧资源参与的区域综合能源系统低碳协同调度模型。首先设置能源系统运营商(energy system operator,ESO)作为领导者,以收益最大化为目标为集群设定内部价格,下层的每个RIES作为追随者,对价格做出响应,并以最小化运行成本为目标建立了主从博弈模型;其次充分考虑电力、燃料、维护和碳交易成本的约束条件,在市场中引入碳交易机制限制二氧化碳排放,并采用差分演化(differential evolution,DE)的种群进化算法不断调整策略逼近博弈均衡;最后针对由三个系统组成的综合能源系统进行考虑需求侧资源参与的区域综合能源系统低碳协同调度分析,案例分析表明在博弈机制的激励下可以优化分布式能源装置的产出,降低运行成本,从而实现多主体利益平衡下的集群协调优化。
基金sponsored by the Project in the National Science&Technology Pillar Program during the Twelfth Five-year Plan Period(Grant No.2011BAJ07B07)Program for the Philosophy and Social Sciences Research of Higher Learning Institutions of Shanxi(Grant No.115544901002)the National Research Foundation(NRF)Singapore(Grant No.FI 370074011)
文摘The interprovincial trade embodied carbon emissions plays an important role in the national emission reduction target among China's provinces. Furthermore, it will affect the smooth start-up of the national carbon trade market as well as the implementation of targets in 2030 for dealing with the climate change. Based on constructed MRIO model, this paper analyzes the embodied carbon emission trade flows among Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei and surrounding regions such as Shanxi, Shaanxi, and Inner Mongolia. The results indicate that six provinces have formed different patterns of carbon trade balance, where Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei provinces are in a deficit position, while the other three provinces are in a surplus position.Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei have transferred part of the carbon emissions to the other three provinces, which shows greater heterogeneity among various provinces and provincial different sectors. On basis of the conclusions, this paper puts forward some suggestions on provincial decomposition, responsibility distribution, and provincial collaborative reduction for national emission reduction targets.
