本文基于Grossman and Helpman(1984)"保护待售"模型的分析框架,运用联立方程组模型,对人民币汇率和关税议案投票表决结果进行实证分析,以揭示利益集团对国会投票的作用机制。分析表明,美国国会对华经贸政策的制定是政府权力...本文基于Grossman and Helpman(1984)"保护待售"模型的分析框架,运用联立方程组模型,对人民币汇率和关税议案投票表决结果进行实证分析,以揭示利益集团对国会投票的作用机制。分析表明,美国国会对华经贸政策的制定是政府权力机关与利益集团意志共同作用的结果,利益集团的政治捐资显著影响议员投票行为,进而影响美国对华经贸政策的制定。此外,美国对华经济贸易政策的决定机制没有显著受到议员所属选区经济特征的影响,侧面暗示了国会议员在贸易政策制定时没有较多关注本选区的经济状况,而是较多地从政治立场出发以及出于吸引更多政治捐资的需要。展开更多
Neither the Chinese nor US economic systems will fundamentally change as a result of overt trade conflict. The challenge for policy-relevant economics is to design a regime for China-US commerce that accepts the co-ex...Neither the Chinese nor US economic systems will fundamentally change as a result of overt trade conflict. The challenge for policy-relevant economics is to design a regime for China-US commerce that accepts the co-existence but also addresses underlying disputes. Many important China-US disputes, notably those over intellectual property protection and state subsidies, cannot be resolved by the World Trade Organization, thus new institutions must be built. Economics-based regime principles should entail recognition that： the China-US bilateral trade imbalance is unique mainly because of macroeconomic and financial factors, not trade; agreements should restrict commercial and government behaviors, not target economic outcomes; Chinese companies must compete and be allowed to succeed in any sector, including high-technology; China is not entitled to US-owned technology, thus intellectual property rights must be enforced; and the US Government should support an increased role for China in global economic governance.展开更多
文摘本文基于Grossman and Helpman(1984)"保护待售"模型的分析框架,运用联立方程组模型,对人民币汇率和关税议案投票表决结果进行实证分析,以揭示利益集团对国会投票的作用机制。分析表明,美国国会对华经贸政策的制定是政府权力机关与利益集团意志共同作用的结果,利益集团的政治捐资显著影响议员投票行为,进而影响美国对华经贸政策的制定。此外,美国对华经济贸易政策的决定机制没有显著受到议员所属选区经济特征的影响,侧面暗示了国会议员在贸易政策制定时没有较多关注本选区的经济状况,而是较多地从政治立场出发以及出于吸引更多政治捐资的需要。
文摘Neither the Chinese nor US economic systems will fundamentally change as a result of overt trade conflict. The challenge for policy-relevant economics is to design a regime for China-US commerce that accepts the co-existence but also addresses underlying disputes. Many important China-US disputes, notably those over intellectual property protection and state subsidies, cannot be resolved by the World Trade Organization, thus new institutions must be built. Economics-based regime principles should entail recognition that： the China-US bilateral trade imbalance is unique mainly because of macroeconomic and financial factors, not trade; agreements should restrict commercial and government behaviors, not target economic outcomes; Chinese companies must compete and be allowed to succeed in any sector, including high-technology; China is not entitled to US-owned technology, thus intellectual property rights must be enforced; and the US Government should support an increased role for China in global economic governance.
