We consider queueing networks （QN＇s） with feedback loops roamed by ＂intelligent＂ agents, able to select their routing on the basis of their measured waiting times at the QN nodes. This is an idealized model to di...We consider queueing networks （QN＇s） with feedback loops roamed by ＂intelligent＂ agents, able to select their routing on the basis of their measured waiting times at the QN nodes. This is an idealized model to discuss the dynamics of customers who stay loyal to a service supplier, provided their service time remains below a critical threshold. For these QN＇s, we show that the traffic flows may exhibit collective patterns typically encountered in multi-agent systems. In simple network topologies, the emergent cooperative behaviors manifest themselves via stable macroscopic temporal oscillations, synchronization of the queue contents and stabilization by noise phenomena. For a wide range of control parameters, the underlying presence of the law of large numbers enables us to use deterministic evolution laws to analytically characterize the cooperative evolution of our multi-agent systems. In particular, we study the case where the servers are sporadically subject, to failures altering their ordinary behavior.展开更多
Explaining the evolution of cooperation remains one of the greatest problems for both biology and social science. The classical theories of cooperation suggest that cooperation equilibrium or evolutionary stable strat...Explaining the evolution of cooperation remains one of the greatest problems for both biology and social science. The classical theories of cooperation suggest that cooperation equilibrium or evolutionary stable strategy between partners can be maintained through genetic similarity or reciprocity relatedness. These classical theories are based on an assumption that partners interact symmetrically with equal payoffs in a game of cooperation interaction. However, the payoff between partners is usually not equal and therefore they often interact asymmetrically in real cooperative systems. With the Hawk–Dove model, we find that the probability of cooperation between cooperative partners will depend closely on the payoff ratio. The higher the payoff ratio between recipients and cooperative actors, the greater will be the probability of cooperation interaction between involved partners. The greatest probability of conflict between cooperative partners will occur when the payoff between partners is equal. The results show that this asymmetric relationship is one of the key dynamics of the evolution of cooperation, and that pure cooperation strategy (i.e., Nash equilibrium) does not exist in asymmetrical cooperation systems, which well explains the direct conflict observed in almost all of the well documented cooperation systems. The model developed here shows that the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation is also negatively correlated with the probability of cooperation interaction. A smaller cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation might be created by the limited dispersal ability or exit cost of the partners involved, and it will make the punishment of the non-cooperative individuals by the recipient more credible, and therefore make it more possible to maintain stable cooperation interaction.展开更多
基金the Fonds National Suisse de la Recherche Scientifique under Grant No.200021-109191/1the Portuguese Fundaao para a Cinca e a Tecnologica(FCT Bolsa FEDER/POCTI-SFA-1-219)The original version was presented on ICSSSM'06.
文摘We consider queueing networks （QN＇s） with feedback loops roamed by ＂intelligent＂ agents, able to select their routing on the basis of their measured waiting times at the QN nodes. This is an idealized model to discuss the dynamics of customers who stay loyal to a service supplier, provided their service time remains below a critical threshold. For these QN＇s, we show that the traffic flows may exhibit collective patterns typically encountered in multi-agent systems. In simple network topologies, the emergent cooperative behaviors manifest themselves via stable macroscopic temporal oscillations, synchronization of the queue contents and stabilization by noise phenomena. For a wide range of control parameters, the underlying presence of the law of large numbers enables us to use deterministic evolution laws to analytically characterize the cooperative evolution of our multi-agent systems. In particular, we study the case where the servers are sporadically subject, to failures altering their ordinary behavior.
基金supported by the National Basic Research Program of China (Grant No. 2007CB411600)the National Natural Sci-ence Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 30670272, 30770500, 10961027 and 10761010)+1 种基金the Yunnan Natural Science Foundation (Grant No. 2009CD104)the State Key Laboratory of Genetic Resources and Evolu-tion and the West Light Foundation of the Chinese Academy of Sciences
文摘Explaining the evolution of cooperation remains one of the greatest problems for both biology and social science. The classical theories of cooperation suggest that cooperation equilibrium or evolutionary stable strategy between partners can be maintained through genetic similarity or reciprocity relatedness. These classical theories are based on an assumption that partners interact symmetrically with equal payoffs in a game of cooperation interaction. However, the payoff between partners is usually not equal and therefore they often interact asymmetrically in real cooperative systems. With the Hawk–Dove model, we find that the probability of cooperation between cooperative partners will depend closely on the payoff ratio. The higher the payoff ratio between recipients and cooperative actors, the greater will be the probability of cooperation interaction between involved partners. The greatest probability of conflict between cooperative partners will occur when the payoff between partners is equal. The results show that this asymmetric relationship is one of the key dynamics of the evolution of cooperation, and that pure cooperation strategy (i.e., Nash equilibrium) does not exist in asymmetrical cooperation systems, which well explains the direct conflict observed in almost all of the well documented cooperation systems. The model developed here shows that the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation is also negatively correlated with the probability of cooperation interaction. A smaller cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation might be created by the limited dispersal ability or exit cost of the partners involved, and it will make the punishment of the non-cooperative individuals by the recipient more credible, and therefore make it more possible to maintain stable cooperation interaction.
