In this paper, the Biham-Middleton-Levine （BML） model with consideration of cooperative willingness has been proposed to study the traffic flow in urban networks. An evolutionary game with a cooperative willingness ...In this paper, the Biham-Middleton-Levine （BML） model with consideration of cooperative willingness has been proposed to study the traffic flow in urban networks. An evolutionary game with a cooperative willingness profile is intro-duced to deal with conflicts between disturbing neighbors. Simulation results suggest that imitating cooperative willingness can ease the effect of premature seizure on traffic flow due to the introduction of evolutionary games. Phase diagrams with a strategy profile and cooperative willingness profile have been investigated in detail. Our findings also prove that by imitating the more successful, cooperative willingness instead of simply the more successful strategies, the evolution of cooperation is significantly promoted, hence improving the order of cooperation and relieving the pressure of traffic networks.展开更多
基金Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.11262003)the Hong Kong Research Grants Council(RGC)-General Research Fund(GRF)Grant,China(Grant No.CityU 118212)+1 种基金the Strategic Research Grant,City University of Hong Kong,China(Grant No.CityU-SRG 7002718)the Graduate Student Innovative Foundation of Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region,China(Grant No.YCSZ2012013)
文摘In this paper, the Biham-Middleton-Levine （BML） model with consideration of cooperative willingness has been proposed to study the traffic flow in urban networks. An evolutionary game with a cooperative willingness profile is intro-duced to deal with conflicts between disturbing neighbors. Simulation results suggest that imitating cooperative willingness can ease the effect of premature seizure on traffic flow due to the introduction of evolutionary games. Phase diagrams with a strategy profile and cooperative willingness profile have been investigated in detail. Our findings also prove that by imitating the more successful, cooperative willingness instead of simply the more successful strategies, the evolution of cooperation is significantly promoted, hence improving the order of cooperation and relieving the pressure of traffic networks.
