The Shenzhen Fair Competition Review System has experienced internal review and cross-examination since its inception.However,it is still dominated by the self-review of policy-making organs,with a lack of effective c...The Shenzhen Fair Competition Review System has experienced internal review and cross-examination since its inception.However,it is still dominated by the self-review of policy-making organs,with a lack of effective control and restraint mechanisms.In addition,insufficient compensatory effect of the external review has led to weak effectiveness of social supervision.Shenzhen is currently the pilot of an independent fair competition review system.The Fair Competition Commission can be set up as an independent review body.Then,the operational mechanism should be improved and the constraints and incentives should be set up scientifically.Last but not the least,by strengthening the social supervision network for fair competition review,the legality and rationality of a wide range of local regulations,rules,and normative documents will be reviewed,thereby regulating the behavior of policy-making organs.展开更多
We examine whether reputable independent directors improve firm performance and governance quality in emerging markets,using data from China.Firms with such directors,measured as the number of directorships in other l...We examine whether reputable independent directors improve firm performance and governance quality in emerging markets,using data from China.Firms with such directors,measured as the number of directorships in other listed firms,have higher profitability,operating efficiency and productivity.They suffer from fewer agency problems,pay more cash dividends and have lower likelihoods of receiving modified audit opinions and participating in financial disclosure-related irregularities than their counterparts.In China’s unique institutional context,the reputation mechanism for independent directors applies to firms in regions with weak marketization environments,nonstate-owned enterprises and firms without political connections;it also applies when external governance is weak.Overall,reputable independent directors appear to occupy valuable advising and monitoring roles and compensate for weak institutions and governance in China.展开更多
基金a phase research result of the 2022 Shenzhen Philosophy and Social Planning Project“Research on the Innovation of Shenzhen Fair Competition Review System”(SZ2022D014).
文摘The Shenzhen Fair Competition Review System has experienced internal review and cross-examination since its inception.However,it is still dominated by the self-review of policy-making organs,with a lack of effective control and restraint mechanisms.In addition,insufficient compensatory effect of the external review has led to weak effectiveness of social supervision.Shenzhen is currently the pilot of an independent fair competition review system.The Fair Competition Commission can be set up as an independent review body.Then,the operational mechanism should be improved and the constraints and incentives should be set up scientifically.Last but not the least,by strengthening the social supervision network for fair competition review,the legality and rationality of a wide range of local regulations,rules,and normative documents will be reviewed,thereby regulating the behavior of policy-making organs.
基金financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.71572160)
文摘We examine whether reputable independent directors improve firm performance and governance quality in emerging markets,using data from China.Firms with such directors,measured as the number of directorships in other listed firms,have higher profitability,operating efficiency and productivity.They suffer from fewer agency problems,pay more cash dividends and have lower likelihoods of receiving modified audit opinions and participating in financial disclosure-related irregularities than their counterparts.In China’s unique institutional context,the reputation mechanism for independent directors applies to firms in regions with weak marketization environments,nonstate-owned enterprises and firms without political connections;it also applies when external governance is weak.Overall,reputable independent directors appear to occupy valuable advising and monitoring roles and compensate for weak institutions and governance in China.
