This paper presents a dynamic closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)model,incorporating a manufacturer,a retailer,and an internet recycling platform(IRP),utilizing differential game theory while considering the forgetting eff...This paper presents a dynamic closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)model,incorporating a manufacturer,a retailer,and an internet recycling platform(IRP),utilizing differential game theory while considering the forgetting effect of consumers.The model encompasses factors such as the quality level of used products and Big Data marketing(BDM),comparing optimal equilibriums under decentralized and cooperative decision scenarios.To effectively coordinate the dynamic CLSC at each time point,we propose a revenue-sharing and cost-sharing(RSCS)combined contract.In addition to ensuring reasonable sharing of revenues and costs,this contract allows the manufacturer to flexibly adjust wholesale prices for final products and transfer prices for used products in order to distribute profits appropriately and achieve Pareto optimality within the CLSC system.Furthermore,our results indicate that there exists a threshold for Big Data marketing efficiency;high-efficiency BDM not only facilitates increased recycling on Internet platforms but also reduces unit recycling costs for enterprises.Interestingly,when implementing the combined contract,Big Data marketing efficiency does not impact the transfer price paid by manufacturers to Internet recycling platforms.展开更多
After building a dynamic evolutionary game model, the essay studies the stability of the equilibrium in the game between the commercial banks and the closed-loop supply chain(CLSC) enterprises. By design of systematic...After building a dynamic evolutionary game model, the essay studies the stability of the equilibrium in the game between the commercial banks and the closed-loop supply chain(CLSC) enterprises. By design of systematic mechanism based on system dynamics theory, capital chains of independent small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs) on CLSC are organically linked together. Moreover, a comparative simulation is studied for the previous independent and post-design dependent systems. The study shows that with business expanding and market risk growing, the independent finance chains of SMEs on CLSC often take on a certain vulnerability, while the SMEs closed-loop supply chain finance system itself is with a strong rigidity and concerto.展开更多
基金supported by funding from National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.72301087 and 71931009National Social Science Fund of China under Grant No.22CGL014+2 种基金Zhejiang Provincial Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.LQ23G010002Zhejiang Provincial Philosophy and Social Sciences Planning Project under Grant No.24NDQN007YBResearch Start-up fund of Hangzhou Normal University under Grant No.4135C50221204091.
文摘This paper presents a dynamic closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)model,incorporating a manufacturer,a retailer,and an internet recycling platform(IRP),utilizing differential game theory while considering the forgetting effect of consumers.The model encompasses factors such as the quality level of used products and Big Data marketing(BDM),comparing optimal equilibriums under decentralized and cooperative decision scenarios.To effectively coordinate the dynamic CLSC at each time point,we propose a revenue-sharing and cost-sharing(RSCS)combined contract.In addition to ensuring reasonable sharing of revenues and costs,this contract allows the manufacturer to flexibly adjust wholesale prices for final products and transfer prices for used products in order to distribute profits appropriately and achieve Pareto optimality within the CLSC system.Furthermore,our results indicate that there exists a threshold for Big Data marketing efficiency;high-efficiency BDM not only facilitates increased recycling on Internet platforms but also reduces unit recycling costs for enterprises.Interestingly,when implementing the combined contract,Big Data marketing efficiency does not impact the transfer price paid by manufacturers to Internet recycling platforms.
基金the Natural Science Research Fund of Hubei Province(No.2014BDH121)
文摘After building a dynamic evolutionary game model, the essay studies the stability of the equilibrium in the game between the commercial banks and the closed-loop supply chain(CLSC) enterprises. By design of systematic mechanism based on system dynamics theory, capital chains of independent small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs) on CLSC are organically linked together. Moreover, a comparative simulation is studied for the previous independent and post-design dependent systems. The study shows that with business expanding and market risk growing, the independent finance chains of SMEs on CLSC often take on a certain vulnerability, while the SMEs closed-loop supply chain finance system itself is with a strong rigidity and concerto.
