摘要
Occupational injuries pose major public health and development related problems. However, efforts towards identification of determinants of labor incidents among salaried workers are still scarce in developing countries. This study aimed to identify sector and time effects on occupational accidents and diseases among Argentinean workers during 2004-2013. A negative binomial panel data model is estimated based on official data on injuries and fatalities in workplaces collected by the Board of Occupational Risks. Business cycle and profitability indicators are used as explanatory variables. Estimations also are adjusted by sector and time effects. Argentina business cycle tends to be negatively related with occupational injuries rates. In contrast, accidents at work reported tend to exhibit longer losses in working days. We also find a positive relationship between profitability and fatal injuries. These results may suggest incentives for under reporting and lower investments in safety by more profitable activities, which can imply some level of endogeneity between profit rate and occupational injuries.
Occupational injuries pose major public health and development related problems. However, efforts towards identification of determinants of labor incidents among salaried workers are still scarce in developing countries. This study aimed to identify sector and time effects on occupational accidents and diseases among Argentinean workers during 2004-2013. A negative binomial panel data model is estimated based on official data on injuries and fatalities in workplaces collected by the Board of Occupational Risks. Business cycle and profitability indicators are used as explanatory variables. Estimations also are adjusted by sector and time effects. Argentina business cycle tends to be negatively related with occupational injuries rates. In contrast, accidents at work reported tend to exhibit longer losses in working days. We also find a positive relationship between profitability and fatal injuries. These results may suggest incentives for under reporting and lower investments in safety by more profitable activities, which can imply some level of endogeneity between profit rate and occupational injuries.
