摘要
The objective of this paper is to study the various possible exchange rate strategies and its applications.For that,we use a game theoretical approach,first with a finite horizon,second with an infinite one.Two strategies are possible (“weak” and “strong”).Depending on the time horizon,the equilibrium solution leads to two main implications.First,in the finite horizon case,an optimal Pareto solution can only be attained if both players mutually agree not on disrupt each other’s expectations on the exchange rate.Secondly,in the infinite horizon situation,it is the interest of each player to address a clear and strong signal to the other about its own strategy.These results have some important policy implications.
The objective of this paper is to study the various possible exchange rate strategies and its applications.For that,we use a game theoretical approach,first with a finite horizon,second with an infinite one.Two strategies are possible (“weak” and “strong”).Depending on the time horizon,the equilibrium solution leads to two main implications.First,in the finite horizon case,an optimal Pareto solution can only be attained if both players mutually agree not on disrupt each other's expectations on the exchange rate.Secondly,in the infinite horizon situation,it is the interest of each player to address a clear and strong signal to the other about its own strategy.These results have some important policy implications.
出处
《统计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2004年第4期38-41,共4页
Statistical Research
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目 (项目批准号 :70 3 410 2 9)
国家教育部博士点人文社会科学研究基金资助项目(项目批准号 :0 1JB790 0 2 2 )阶段性成果
