摘要
安然事件暴露了会计体系与公司治理方面的缺陷 ,因为对股东而言 ,他们难以接受在投资风险中还含有“会计作假风险”这个风险因素。通过建立博弈模型可以发现 ,现有企业制度破坏了所有者、企业、会计师事务所三方的利益及风险制衡关系 ,而形成了企业与监管者、事务所与监管者两种利益关系。在前者关系下 ,会计诚信度高且持久 ;在后者关系下 ,会计诚信度不但低 ,而且随着监管有效度的高低而时隐时现。因此 ,如何提高监管体系的有效程度变得非常重要。
The Enron scandal, one of the disguised Wall Street’s Here-today-gone-tomorrow success stories, exposes the defect in the current Accounting system and corporate governance. It is not easy for stockholders to accept a hard kernel of oft-neglected truth: they have to incorporate “the risk of accounting fraud” into the overall risk of their investment. Tentatively, this paper establishes a theoretical frame in which there are two game models that for the first time apply the game theory to analyzing the problem of accounting dishonesty. It finds out that the form of “modern corporate organization” destroys the correlated equilibrium of each player-stockholders, firm and CPA firm. The equilibrium result of the first model is substantially more stationed than the second one, and as a result the former is considered in a high quality state of accounting honesty while the later in a low quality state of accounting honesty which makes the need of enhancing the efficiency of the monitoring system becomes essential than ever before.
出处
《吉林大学社会科学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2004年第3期43-51,共9页
Jilin University Journal Social Sciences Edition