摘要
美国单边威胁性贸易政策在什么条件下能最有效地打开海外市场 ?本文通过对 30 1条款的研究 ,在“两层游戏”理论的基础上建立一种模式 ,以求解释在哪些情况下美国国内利益集团及政府机构将一致支持威胁性谈判手段。其结论是 :美国制裁威胁在对待与其存在竞争性贸易结构的国家 (如日本、加拿大及欧盟 )时 ,应比在对待与其存在互补性贸易结构的国家 (如中国、印度和巴西 )时更能获得国内利益的支持 ,从而制裁更为有效。
Under what conditions does the American aggressively-unilateral trade policy work best to open up overseas markets? After examining the successful and unsuccessful use of Section 301 of the American trade law,this essay argues that the trade structures of America and its trading partners affect the solidarity and consensus among domestic interest groups and between the executive and legislative bodies in America,which consequently determine the effectiveness of the threat of the aggressively-unilateral trade policy.American threats of sanction will enjoy more unified domestic support and hence be more effective only when the trade disputes involve a country that possesses competitive,rather than complementary,trade relations with America.
出处
《世界经济与政治》
CSSCI
北大核心
2004年第4期56-61,共6页
World Economics and Politics
