摘要
新归纳之谜是古德曼对休谟归纳问题的确证式划归。它的内涵是似律性假说和偶似假说的区分问题。伽登佛斯的概念空间方案试图以凸性规则为可投射性的标准,进而达到区分似律性假说和偶似假说的目的。但本文表明,凸性规则既不是可投射性的充分条件也不是它的必要条件,因而概念空间方案并未解决新归纳之谜。
The new riddle of induction is a kind of confirmationary reduction for the induction problem that Nelson Goodman does. The connotation of the riddle is what distinguishes lawlike hypotheses from accidental ones. In his conceptuardenfors regards convexity rule as the criterion of projectibility, and uses it to distinguish lawlike hypotheses from accidental ones. But I will show that the convexity rule is neither a sufficient condition nor a necessary condition. So the conceptual space solution can't solve the new riddle of induction.
出处
《自然辩证法研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2004年第3期54-58,共5页
Studies in Dialectics of Nature
基金
国家社科基金项目"当代西方逻辑哲学最新成就研究"(编号D3BZX043)
