摘要
商业银行作为经营货币的特殊企业,因其高负债、网络化和风险承担机制的特殊性,其治理是不能简单套用一般企业治理中的"股东"逻辑理论的,因此有必要寻找一个全新的分析框架。本文基于对商业银行契约性质的再认识,提出了商业银行治理的"契约型"逻辑。本文认为,商业银行是一个关于组织准租的创造与分配的货币经营型市场契约,决定银行所有权配置的根本性条件是各签约人的"谈判实力"。本文所提出的"契约型"治理逻辑,是一种货币经营型市场契约意义上的银行治理观,它强调的不是股东单边治理,而是具有谈判实力的各签约方之间的多边合作治理。
Since commercial banks are enterprises that run money and credit with high debt ratio, multi-layer network and specific risk sharing mechanism, their corporate governance could not be fully explained by traditional shareholding methodology. This paper puts forward a new framework, the contractual theory, based on the review on the contractual nature commercial banks. First, this paper regards commercial banks as a monetary contract which creates and distributes organizational quasi-rent, thus the status-quo of each negotiator dominates ownership allocation. Second, a multi-cooperation mechanism should replace the current single shareholder's control.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2004年第1期105-116,共12页
Journal of Financial Research
关键词
商业银行
“股东”逻辑
契约结构
组织准租
“契约型”逻辑
commercial banks, shareholding logistics, contractual structure, organizational quasi-rent, contractual methodology
