摘要
专名问题及指称问题是语言哲学的基本问题。弗雷格对专名的理解相当宽泛,并认为专名通过他所谓的涵义(sense)间接地与实在相联系。而罗素与其意见相左,严格区分了专名和摹状词这两种符号,并提出了逻辑专名和普通专名在指称功能上的不同,断言一切真正的专名(即逻辑专名)都直接地进行指称。摹状词则不是直接指示某一个体,只有在其他符号的上下文中才具有意义。
Proper name and reference are two basic concerns in the philosophy of language. According to Frege, proper names are wide in range and refer to the reality through sense. Differently, Russell distinguishes between proper name and description. The former refers to the reality directly while the latter, which can only be meaningful within context, does not designate a single object directly. He also points out the differences between proper name and ordinary name.
出处
《唐山师范学院学报》
2004年第1期35-36,108,共3页
Journal of Tangshan Normal University
