摘要
基于政府的补贴和合作博弈的方法研究了电动汽车供应链的最优定价与期望销量等问题。结果表明:政府的补贴可以提高销量,并惠及供应链上的所有成员;而且补贴额度越高,供应链绩效越好,但是,政府补贴效率越来越低,或者说,补贴的刺激政策成本越来越高。研究还发现,反映制造商赢利能力的Lerner指数正好等于期望需求对价格弹性的倒数。
This paper studies such issues as optimal pricing and expected demand of the electric vehicle supply chain,based on the government's subsidy and the approach of cooperative game. The research shows that the government's subsidy can promote the sales,and benefit all members of the supply chain. Moreover,the more the subsidy,the better the performance of the supply chain,but the worse the government's subsidy efficiency,in other words,the more the cost promoting the sales of electric vehicles. The research also implies that the manufacturer's Lerner index,reflecting its market power,is equal to the inverse of the price elasticity of the expected demand.
出处
《管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第12期198-205,共8页
Management Review
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71461009
71261006
71371089
71362010)
关键词
政府补贴
电动汽车
供应链
合作博弈
government's subsidy,electric vehicle,supply chain,cooperative game
