摘要
随着经济的高速增长,中国已成为世界上二氧化碳排放量增长最快的国家。因此,为促进低碳经济的发展,如何有效地引导企业主动实施低碳供应链管理已成为政府和社会目前亟待解决的问题。本文以政府和低碳供应链上的核心企业为博弈主体,通过分析政府和核心企业在不同博弈策略下各自的成本和收益,建立动态进化博弈模型,得出核心企业和政府监管博弈的进化稳定策略,从而阐释了企业逃避政府监管的深层原因。研究表明,核心企业开展低碳供应链的收益和成本,政府对企业开展低碳供应链的奖惩力度,都直接影响博弈结果。
With the rapid development of economy,China has become the fastest dioxide emissions increasing country. In order to promote the development of low-carbon economy,how to guide the enterprise to actively and effectively implement the low-carbon supply chain management have become the presently existing problems to be urgently solved of the government and the society. In this paper, the government and the core enterprise are the main body of the game in the low-carbon supply chain. Different game strategies are analyzed in their costs and benefits; the dynamic evolutionary game model is established and obtained the evolutionary stable strategy of their game. Thus the deep reason is explained that why the enterprise always try to escape from the government supervision. In addition,it shows that the costs and benefits of the core enterprises to implement low-carbon supply chain management,subsidies and punishments from governments directly affect the game results.
出处
《中国人口·资源与环境》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第S1期27-30,共4页
China Population,Resources and Environment
基金
兰州大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(编号:10LZUJBWZY014)
关键词
低碳供应链
进化博弈
复制动态
模型
low-carbon supply chain
evolutionary game theory
replicator dynamics
model
