摘要
本文运用斯坦伯格博弈模型,分析了联合定价策略下生产两种具有一定替代性的水果的果农对下游水果零售商的选择问题。果农—零售商的水果供应链采用批发价—加价率的定价模式,果农对合作伙伴的选择有两种情形:一是将两种水果都批发给一个零售商,二是将两种水果各批发给一个零售商。本文通过对上述两种情形进行分析得出:两种情形下果农对批发价的决策不变,但第二种情形下零售商对水果的加价率减小,进而增加了零售市场的总需求量,刺激了果农的投资行为,最终提高了果农的利润。
Using a Steinberg game model,the paper analyzes the problem of selecting dow nstream cooperative partner for a fruit-producer who produces two kinds of fruits with some substitutability under joint-pricing strategy. A wholesale-price and profit-margins’ pricing mode has been proposed in the producer-retailers’ fruit supply chain,fruit-producer can choose two ways to wholesale his fruits: one is to wholesale a retailer both fruits,the other is to wholesale every retailer one kind of the fruits. Through analyzing the two kinds of situations,the paper has concluded that under the two circumstances fruit-producer’s decisions of wholesale-price haven’t been changed,while under the second circumstances,retailers have reduced his profit-margins which will increase retail market’ total demand and stimulate fruit-producer’ investment,so it will eventually improve fruit-producer’s profit.
作者
凌六一
胡中菊
Ling Liuyi;Hu Zhongju
出处
《中国食品安全治理评论》
2018年第2期194-204,227,共12页
China Food Safety Management Review
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(项目编号:70871105,70821001)
