摘要
流域横向生态补偿是中国推进生态文明建设和主体功能区战略的重要制度创新,这项试点目前尚处于探索阶段。本文从生态服务产权交易的视角,探讨了中国跨省横向生态补偿协议的经济学基础,以及其对科斯定理和庇古税的扬弃与融合。本文利用完全信息的双边博弈模型,发现流域上下游政府通过谈判可以在水质标准上达成内生均衡,这种谈判实质上是建立在状态依存型的排污权初始分配的基础上的,它部分代替了科斯定理中关于产权明晰化的严格假设,可以最终实现具有帕累托效率的产权交易。本文还证明在信息不完全的现实条件下,内生均衡难以自发实现,需要中央政府作为仲裁人介入双边谈判,并通过纵向补偿弥合横向补偿中的“价格鸿沟”,降低交易成本。本文最后指出了这种混合型的补偿机制存在的问题,并提出了相应的政策建议。本文对于深入推进中国流域横向生态补偿有一定的参考价值。
This paper undertakes an institutional economics analysis of the interprovince ecological compensation agreements, and their sublation and integration to Coase Theorem and Pigovian Tax by the perspective of the payment for the ecosystem services in Chinese watershed. Based on the bilateral game model with complete information, this paper finds that the endogenous equilibrium of water quality standards can be reached between the upstream and downstream governments in the basin through the negotiation. In fact, the environmental standards recognized by both sides plays the role of the initial allocation of the state-dependent emission rights,and the partially replacement of the strict assumptions about the property rights in the Coase theorem, ultimately lead to a transaction with the Pareto efficiency. This paper also proves that under the condition of incomplete information,endogenous equilibrium can not be achieved, and the central government needs to be involved as an arbitrator in bilateral negotiations, and the nested contract with vertical and horizontal compensation will help to reduce transaction costs and bridge the "price gap" in bilateral negotiation. At last, it points out the problems existing in the hybrid compensation mechanism, and puts forward some policy suggestions.
出处
《制度经济学研究》
CSSCI
2018年第3期23-44,共22页
Research on Institutional Economics
基金
国家哲学社会科学基金重大项目“我国重点生态功能区市场化生态补偿机制研究”(15ZDA054)的阶段性研究成果
关键词
流域
横向生态补偿
科斯定理
状态依存型产权
帕累托效率
Watershed
Horizontal Ecological Compensation
Coase Theorem
State-dependent Property Rights
Pareto Efficiency
